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Montreal versus Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols
Cass R. Sunstein*

Abstract

Over the last thirty years, climate change and depletion of the ozone layer have
been widely believed to be the world's largest environmental problems. The two problems
have many similarities. Both involve global risks created by diverse nations, and both
seem to be best handled through international agreements. In addition, both raise serious
issues of intergenerational and international equity. Future generations stand to lose a
great deal, whereas the costs of restrictions would be borne in the first instance by the
current generation; and while wealthy nations are largely responsible for the current
situation, poorer nations, above all Africa and India, are anticipated to be quite
vulnerable in the future. But an extraordinarily successful agreement, the Montreal
Protocol, has served largely to eliminate the production and use of ozone-depleting
chemicals, while the Kyoto Protocol has spurred only modest steps toward stabilizing
greenhouse gas emissions. What accounts for the dramatic difference between the two
protocols? Part of the explanation lies in the radically different self-interested judgments
of the United States; part of the explanation lies in the very different payoff structures of
the two agreements. Influenced by the outcome of a purely domestic cost-benefit analysis
involving reductions in ozone-depleting chemicals, the United States enthusiastically
supported the Montreal Protocol. Influenced by the very different outcome of cost-benefit
analyses for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, the United States aggressively
opposed the Kyoto Protocol. An examination of the two protocols suggests that neither
agreement fit the simple structure of a prisoner's dilemma, in which a nation gains from
an enforceable agreement, gains even more if it is the only nation not to comply while all
others do, and loses most if it, and everyone else, pursue their own national self-interest.
For the United States, at least, compliance with the Montreal Protocol would have been
justified even if no other country had complied; for the United States, and for several
other countries, compliance with the Kyoto Protocol would not have been justified even if
all other parties had complied. An understanding of the judgments that surround the two
protocols indicates that even though moral considerations require the United States to
spend a great deal to protect citizens in other nations, and even though such
considerations can influence behavior, the nation is unlikely to act in response solely to
those considerations. A general implication is that any international agreement to control
greenhouse gases is unlikely to be effective unless the United States believes that it has
*
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more to gain than to lose. An illuminating wrinkle, also suggestive of the role of domestic
self-interest, is that some European nations, above all the United Kingdom, initially
contended that ozone depletion was a greatly exaggerated problem while later calling for
strong controls on greenhouse gases. For an international accord, an exceedingly
serious problem lies in the fact that while the United States and China would have to
bear the lion’s share of the cost of emissions reductions, both nations are projected to
lose relatively less from climate change.
“I am pleased to sign the instrument of ratification for the Montreal protocol
[governing] substances that deplete the ozone layer. The protocol marks an important
milestone for the future quality of the global environment and for the health and wellbeing of all peoples of the world. Unanimous approval of the protocol by the Senate on
March 14th demonstrated to the world community this country's willingness to act
promptly and decisively in carrying out its commitments to protect the stratospheric
ozone layer . . .”
— Ronald Reagan1

“I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it . . . would cause serious harm to the U.S.
economy. The Senate's vote, 95-0, shows that there is a clear consensus that the Kyoto
Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing global climate change
concerns.”
— George W. Bush2

Of the world’s environmental challenges, the two most significant may well be
stratospheric ozone depletion and climate change. At first glance, the problems appear to
be closely related. In fact ozone depletion and climate change are so similar that many
Americans are unable to distinguish between them.3 Consider seven similarities between
the two problems:
1.

Both ozone depletion and climate change have received public recognition on
the basis of relatively recent scientific work, theoretical and empirical. The
risks associated with ozone depletion were first explored in a theoretical paper
in 1974.4 The risks of climate change have a much longer history, with an

1

See http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1079/is_n2135_v88/ai_6495606
See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html
3
See Andrew Dessler and Edward Parson, The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change 10-11
(2006)
4
See Robert Percival et al., Environmental Regulation 1047 (2003).
2
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early paper in 1896,5 but the current scientific consensus is very much a
product of the 1990s.6
Both problems involve the effects of emissions from man-made technologies
that come from diverse nations and that threaten to cause large-scale harm.
Both ozone-depleting chemicals and greenhouse gases stay in the atmosphere
for an extremely long time. Hence the relevant risks are difficult to reverse;
even with action that is both immediate and aggressive, the underlying
problems will hardly be eliminated all at once.7 This point has significant
implications for issues of timing.
No nation is able to eliminate either problem on its own. Indeed, no nation is
even able to make significant progress on either problem on its own, certainly
not in the long run.8 Because of the diversity of contributors, both problems
seem to be best handled through international agreements.9
Both problems involve extremely serious problems of international equity.
Wealthy nations have been the principal contributors to both ozone depletion
and climate change, and hence it is plausible to argue that corrective justice
requires wealthy nations to pay poorer ones to reduce the underlying risks.
This argument might well mean that poor nations should be compensated for
their willingness to enter into any international agreements that reduce
emissions levels. Wealthy countries might owe significant duties of financial
and technological assistance, either to help in emissions reduction or to pay
for adaptation to the underlying problems.
Both problems present extremely serious problems of intergenerational equity.
Future generations are likely to face greater risks than the current generation,
and a key question is how much the present should be willing to sacrifice for
the benefit of the future. The answer to this question is complicated by two
facts: Future generations are likely to be much wealthier than our own, and
expenditures by the present, decreasing national wealth, may end up harming

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.
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See Scott Barrett, Environment & Statecraft 363 (2005). Indeed, an even earlier paper, from 1827,
sketched the possible contribution of greenhouse gases. See James Houghton, Global Warming: The
Complete Briefing 17 (3d edition 2004).
6
Dessler and Parson, supra note, at 64-66. I refer to a scientific consensus, but there are dissenting
voices. See, e.g., Nir Shaviv, The Spiral Structure of the Milky Way, Cosmic Rays, and Ice Age Epochs on
Earth, 8 New Astronomy 39 (2003) (arguing that cosmic rays are responsible for most of recent variations
in global temperatures); Nir Shaviv and J. Veizer, Celestial driver of Phanerozoic climate?, 13 GSA Today,
4 (2003). A reply is Stefan Rahmstorf et al., Cosmic Rays, Carbon Dioxide and Climate, in Eos,
Transactions of the American Geophysical Union (January 27, 2004).
7
For ozone depletion, see Barrett, supra note; for climate change, the point is emphasized and explored
in Richard Posner, Catastrophe 161-63 (2004).
8
A qualification is that the United States now accounts for about one-fifth of the world’s emissions,
and that by 2025, China will account for nearly one-fourth of the world’s emissions. See infra. If either
nation entirely eliminated its emissions – to say the least, an unlikely prospect – the progress might count as
significant. Note, however, that because greenhouse gas emissions are cumulative, even a total elimination
of greenhouse gas emissions, from the United States and China, would not make a major dent in the
problem.
9
As we shall see, however, these statements must be qualified for ozone depletion. For some nations,
including the United States, unilateral action was worthwhile. See below; James Murdoch and Todd
Sandler, The Voluntary Provision of a Public Good: The Case of Reduced CFC Emissions and the
Montreal Protocol, 63 J Public Economics 331 (1997).
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future generations, simply by ensuring that they too have less wealth on which
to draw.
With respect to both problems, the United States is a crucial actor, probably
the most important in the world.10 The importance of the United States lies not
only in its wealth and power; it also lies in the fact that the United States has
been an extremely significant source of both ozone-depleting chemicals and
greenhouse gases.11

7.

Notwithstanding these similarities, there is one obvious difference between the
two problems. An international agreement, originally signed in Montreal and designed to
control ozone-depleting chemicals, has been ratified by almost all nations in the world
(including the United States, where ratification was unanimous).12 At last count, 183
nations have ratified the Montreal Protocol.13 Nations are complying with their
obligations; global emissions of ozone-depleting chemicals have been reduced by over
95%; and atmospheric concentrations of such chemicals have been declining since
1994.14 By 2050, the ozone layer is expected to return to its natural level.15 The Montreal
Protocol, the foundation for this process, thus stands as an extraordinary and even
spectacular success story. Its success owes a great deal to the actions not only of the
United States government, which played an exceedingly aggressive role in producing the
Protocol,16 but to American companies as well, which stood in the forefront of technical
innovation leading to substitutes for ozone-depleting chemicals.17
With climate change, the situation is altogether different. To be sure, an
international agreement, produced in Kyoto in 1997, did go into force in 2005, when
Russia ratified it18; the Kyoto Protocol has now been ratified by over 130 nations.19 But
numerous nations are not complying with their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol,20
and the United States firmly rejects the agreement, with unanimous bipartisan opposition
to its ratification. Far from leading technical innovation, American companies have
sharply opposed efforts to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and have insisted that the
costs of regulation are likely to be prohibitive.21 Between 1990 and 2004, the United
10

On ozone depletion, see Robert Percival et al., Environmental Regulation 1048 (2003) (United States
accounted for almost one-half of global CFC use in the mid-1970s); Record Increase in U.S. Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Reported (2006), available at http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr2006/2006-04-1802.asp (United States accounts for about 25% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions).
11
See id.
12
For the text of the Montreal Protocol, as amended, see http://www.unep.org/ozone/MontrealProtocol/Montreal-Protocol2000.shtml
13
Scott Barrett, Environment & Statecraft 239 (2005).
14
See id.
15
Id.
16
See Edward Parson, Protecting the Ozone Layer 252-53 (2003).
17
See Percival et al., supra note, at 1051; Edward Parson, Protecting the Ozone Layer 126-27, 176-77,
180-82 (2003).
18
See Andrew Dessler and Edward Parson, The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change 129
(2006).
19
See Al Gore, An Inconvenient Truth 282-83 (2006).
20
See below.
21
Seer George Pring, The United States Perspective, in Kyoto: From Principles to Practice 185, 195-97
(Peter Cameron and Donald Zillman eds. 2001).
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States experienced a decline in emissions of ozone-depleting chemicals, to the point
where such emissions are essentially zero. But in the same period, the United States
experienced a rapid growth in greenhouse gases.22 In part as a result, worldwide
emissions of greenhouse gases are projected to rise at a rapid rate. An additional
complication stems from the fact that developing nations have refused to join the Kyoto
Protocol, and it is in those nations that greenhouse gases are increasingly most rapidly. In
particular, India and China have shown explosive growth in recent years, and China will
soon become the leading greenhouse gas emitter in the world. 23
My goal in this Article is to understand why the Montreal Protocol has been so
much more successful than the Kyoto Protocol, and in the process to shed some light on
the prospects for other international agreements, including those designed to control the
problem of climate change. A central conclusion is simple: Both the success of the
Montreal Protocol and the mixed picture for the Kyoto Protocol were largely driven by
the decisions of the United States, and those decisions were driven in turn by a form of
purely domestic cost-benefit analysis. To the United States, the monetized benefits of the
Montreal Protocol dwarfed the monetized costs, and hence the circumstances were
extremely promising for American support and even enthusiasm for the agreement.
Remarkably, the United States had so much to lose from depletion of the ozone layer that
it would have been worthwhile for the nation to act unilaterally to take the steps required
by the Montreal Protocol.24 For the world as a whole, the argument for the Montreal
Protocol was overwhelmingly strong.
The Kyoto Protocol presented a radically different picture. To the United States
alone, the monetized benefits of the Kyoto Protocol appeared to be dwarfed by the
monetized costs.25 If the United States complied with the Kyoto Protocol on its own, it
would spend a great deal and gain relatively little. If all parties complied, some of the
most influential analyses suggested that the United States would nonetheless be a net
loser. Because of the distinctive properties of the agreement, it was not at all clear that the
world as a whole had more to gain than to lose from the Kyoto Protocol. Hence the
circumstances were unpromising for a successful agreement—and they were especially
unpromising for American participation, no matter the political affiliation of the relevant
president. The different cost-benefit assessments, for the United States in particular but
also for the world, provide the central explanation for the success of one agreement and
the complex picture for the other.
There is a more general point. For the United States, and for other key nations as
well, the payoff structures of the two agreements were fundamentally different. For some
22

See below.
See infra.
24
See Parson, supra note, at 228.
25
See William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Warming the World (2000); below. In the Clinton
Administration, certain studies suggested low costs from compliance with Kyoto, see Pring, supra note, at
194, but those studies were not widely accepted even within the executive branch, see id. at 196.
Throughout I emphasize the importance of an analysis of costs and benefits, but that analysis is not the only
relevant factor. Enforcement issues, for example, create serious problems for the Kyoto Protocol – more
serious than for the Montreal Protocol. See Barrett, supra note.
23
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nations, most prominently including the United States, unilateral compliance with the
requirements of the Montreal Protocol was justified, even if no other nation complied. It
would be impossible to make this point about the Kyoto Protocol. Indeed, it is plausible
to suggest that for the United States, and for some other nations including China in
particular, compliance with the Kyoto Protocol was not justified even if such compliance
was both necessary and sufficient to ensure that all parties complied. Neither situation
presented the simplest situation for an international agreement: a prisoner’s dilemma in
which all or most nations will do badly if each acts in its individual self-interest, but gain
a great deal if all are able to enter into a binding agreement.
The Montreal Protocol did not present a prisoner’s dilemma because key nations,
including the United States, would gain from unilateral action; and in fact, many nations
engaged in such action.26 The problem of climate change might well present a prisoner’s
dilemma, in the sense that nations and their citizens, acting in their private self-interest,
may produce bad or even catastrophic outcomes that can be avoided with a binding
agreement (whose provisions of course must be specified). But for the United States, and
for at least some other nations as well, the Kyoto Protocol did not solve the prisoner’s
dilemma, because it led to an outcome even worse than what would follow from
unregulated self-interested action by all sides.
In both cases, the United States (and it was hardly alone in this respect) acted like
homo economicus—a self-interested welfare maximizer, focusing not on its moral
obligations, but on the material incentives.27 If this point generalizes, we might think of it
as suggesting a kind of individual rationality constraint, or at least constraining factor,
operating at the level of nations.28 The different cost-benefit assessments help to explain
other apparent anomalies as well. For example, they illuminate the pattern of apparently
universal compliance with the Montreal Protocol and the likelihood of widespread
noncompliance with the Kyoto Protocol. They help explain why many nations reduced
their CFC emissions before the Montreal Protocol took effect—and why their reductions
were not only in advance but also in excess of the mandates of the agreement.29 They also
help explain the fact that American companies strongly supported the Montreal Protocol
26

See Murdoch and Sandler, supra note.
A helpful, supportive discussion, which also requires a qualification, is Stephen J. DeCanio,
Economic Analysis, Environmental Policy, and Intergenerational Justice in the Reagan Administration, 3
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 299 (2003). The support stems
from the fact that the core analysis came from “projected health risks to the U.S. population from
stratospheric ozone depletion.” Id. at 302. The qualification is that the choice of a relatively low discount
rate, for the future, can be taken to suggest a degree of altruism toward future generations, through a
principle of intergenerational neutrality. See id. Note, however, that these were future generations of
Americans.
28
The point is emphasized more generally in Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, The Limits of
International Law (2005). An evident problem with rational actor models, for both individual and states, is
that such models are powerless to explain decisions without a sense of the relevant utility functions – of
what concerns the relevant actors. If the relevant actors care about endangered species, wherever they
might be found, then it is in their rational self-interest to attempt to protect endangered species, wherever
they might be found. In the context of the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols, I shall emphasize the role of
purely material concerns, including of course concerns about the health and wealth of American citizens.
29
See Murdoch and Sandler, supra note, at 347.
27
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while sharply opposing the Kyoto Protocol. They help explain why China and India
refused to participate in the Kyoto Protocol. They illuminate another apparent anomaly:
European nations, above all the United Kingdom, were initially quite cautious in reacting
to the problem of ozone depletion, suggesting that the scientific evidence was both
theoretical and speculative, while European nations, above all the United Kingdom, have
been quite aggressive in reacting to the problem of climate change.
For the future, the implications of these points are simple. With respect to
international agreements in general, the participation of the United States, and of other
nations as well, is greatly affected by perceived domestic consequences.30 To say this is
not to deny that moral judgments may play some role and perhaps a significant one—not
only but above all if injured nations are in a position to punish those who do not diminish
their injury. Many billions of dollars are spend each year on foreign aid,31 and an
international agreement to control global environmental problems might operate as a
form of such aid. If, for example, the citizens of the United States care a great deal about
the welfare of endangered species, the nation may well be willing to enter into a costly
agreement to protect endangered species. As we shall see, there are exceedingly good
reasons, grounded in corrective justice, to ask the United States to assist those nations
that are most vulnerable as a result of climate change. But if the United States is spending
much more than it receives, it is unlikely to be an enthusiastic participant.
For climate change in particular, it is reasonable to predict that the United States
will ratify an international agreement to reduce greenhouse gases only if the perceived
domestic costs of the relevant reductions decrease, the perceived domestic benefits
increase, or both. There is a more general lesson. Without the participation of the United
States, the success of any such agreement is likely to be limited, if only because the
United States accounts for such a high percentage of the world’s greenhouse gas
emissions. Indeed, I have noted that China and India are anticipated to be large emitters
in the near future,32 and they are most unlikely to participate if the United States does not.
The case of China is particularly important. China will soon be the world’s leading
emitter of greenhouse gases, and both the United States and China are in the position of
having relatively less to lose from climate change and relatively much to lose from
controls on greenhouse gases. These points have large implications for the prospects for
and contents of a successful agreement, to which I shall turn in due course.
The remainder of this Article comes in three parts. Part II explores the Montreal
Protocol and the role of scientific evidence, European caution, American enthusiasm, and
cost-benefit analysis in producing it. Part III examines the Kyoto Protocol and American
30

This is an explicit theme of James H. Maxwell and Sanford L. Weiner, Green Consciousness or
Dollar Diplomacy? The British Response to the Threat of Ozone Depletion, 5 International Environmental
Affairs 19 (1993).
31
See Congressional Research Service, Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and
Policy (January 19, 2005) (reporting, among other things, $7.35 billion for development assistant, id. at 4,
and $2.68 billion in humanitarian assistance, id. at 6).
32
See James Houghton, Global Warming: The Complete Briefing 244-45 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that
between 1990 and 2000, China saw a nineteen percent increase in greenhouse gas emissions, and India a
sixty-eight percent increase).
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reservations, with special emphasis on the possibility that the agreement would deliver
low benefits for the world and impose significant costs—with particularly high costs, and
particularly low benefits, expected for the United States. Part IV explores the lessons and
implications of the two tales.
I. Ozone and Montreal
A. Science and Policy
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were originally used as working fluids for
refrigerators, in part because they appeared to be far safer than the alternatives, which
were either inflammable or dangerously toxic.33 In the decades that followed, CFCs were
found to have numerous cooling applications, prominently including air-conditioning.
But CFCs came to be used most significantly as propellants in aerosol spray cans.34 CFCs
and related chemicals, prominently including halons, acquired widespread commercial
and military uses,35 producing billions of dollars in revenues.
The idea that CFCs posed a threat to the ozone layer was initially suggested in an
academic paper in 1974, written by Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina.36 According
to Rowland and Molina, CFCs would migrate slowly through the upper atmosphere,
where they would release chlorine atoms that could endanger the ozone layer, which
protects the earth from sunlight.37 Rowland and Molina specified the “catalytic chain by
which the chlorine atoms released would destroy ozone.”38 The potential consequences
for human health were clear, for Rowland and Molina wrote only two years after the loss
of ozone had been linked with skin cancer.39 In 1971, it had been prominently suggested
that a one percent ozone loss would cause an additional 7000 cases of skin cancer each
year.40 Hence the finding by Rowland and Molina indicated that significant health risks
might well be created by emissions of CFCs.
In the immediately following years, depletion of the ozone layer received
widespread attention in the United States, which was the world’s leading contributor to
the problem, accounting for nearly 50 percent of global CFC use.41 A great deal of
theoretical and empirical work was done within the scientific community; the National
Academy of Sciences and many others made contributions.42 Much of the relevant
research was supportive of the initial claims by Molina and Rowland.43 At the same time,
industry attempted to conduct and publicize its own research, mounting an aggressive
33

See Parson, supra note, at 20.
Id. at 21.
35
Id. at 22.
36
See Percival et al., at 1047.
37
Id. at 1047-49.
38
Parson, supra note, at 23.
39
Id. at 24.
40
Id. at 25.
41
See Benedick, supra note, at 26.
42
Benedick, supra note, at 11.
43
Parson, supra note, at 33.
34

8

public relations campaign to discredit the association between CFCs and ozone
depletion.44 A senior executive at DuPont, the world’s largest producer, testified before a
Senate panel that the “chlorine-ozone hypothesis is at this time purely speculative with no
concrete evidence . . . to support it.”45 At the very least, industry representatives
suggested no harm would come from each year’s delay and that costly regulation should
not be imposed until further research had been established that real risks were involved.46
Nonetheless, intense media attention to the problem greatly affected consumer
behavior. In a brief period, American consumers responded to warnings by cutting their
demand for aerosol sprays by more than half, thus dramatically affecting the market.47
The same public concern spurred domestic regulation. In 1977, Congress amended the
Clean Air Act to permit the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to regulate “any substance . . . which in his judgment may reasonably be
anticipated to affect the stratosphere, especially ozone in the stratosphere, if such effect
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”48 In 1978, EPA
used the Toxic Substances Control Act49 to ban the use of CFCs as aerosol propellants in
nonessential applications and defined criteria for exemptions of “essential uses.”50 As a
result of the ban, aerosol production in the United States fell by nearly 95 percent.51 A
significant reduction in the American contribution to ozone depletion was achieved in a
way that “was remarkably fast, simple, and seemingly rational”—and that imposed little
cost.52
The role of the public is especially noteworthy here. It is not surprising to find
considerable mobilization on the part of environmentalists and those with
environmentalist inclinations. But changes in consumer behavior were quite widespread,
in a way that makes a sharp contrast with other domains (including climate change). Two
points seem relevant here. The first is that skin cancer, the harm associated with ozone
depletion, is highly salient and easily envisioned; and a salient, easily envisioned harm is
especially likely to affect behavior.53 This point is connected to the fact that it is not
difficult to energize people with the vivid image of a loss of the earth’s “protective
shield.” The second point is that the change in consumer behavior was not, in fact,
extremely burdensome to consumers. Aerosol spray cans are not central to daily life, and
a refusal to purchase them, or a decision to take other steps to reduce uses of ozonedepleting chemicals, did not impose large costs. Because the relevant harms were vivid,
directly involving human health, and because no real hardship was imposed by taking
steps to reduce those costs, consumer behavior was significantly affected. As we shall
see, there is no parallel in the context of climate change.
44

Benedick, supra note, at 12.
Id.
46
Parson, supra note, at 33.
47
Benedick, supra note, at 28, 31.
48
42 USC 7457(b).
49
15 USC 2605.
50
43 Fed Reg 11301 (1978).
51
Benedick, supra note, at 24.
52
Parson, supra note, at 40.
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See Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (2005).
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Despite the flurry of domestic activity, no international agreement was in sight. In
fact the effort to produce international cooperation was at first “an unmitigated failure.”54
A central reason was the skepticism and opposition of the European Community, which
firmly rejected regulatory measures of the sort taken by the United States.55 In Europe, it
was widely believed that science did not justify those measures, which would inflict high
costs for speculative benefits. In most European countries, unlike in the United States, the
public was relatively indifferent to the ozone question.56 Heavily influenced by private
groups with an economic stake in the outcome, most European nations resorted to
symbols rather than regulatory restrictions.57 Such symbols included voluntary emissions
codes, unaccompanied by regulatory requirements of any kind.58 Industry arguments
about the expense of such requirements, and the potential loss of tens of thousands of
jobs, contributed heavily to the weak response of the European Community.59 The result
of the disparity in reactions, and a source of continuing tensions between the United
States and Europe, was a significant shift from American to European dominance in
emissions of CFCs.60
While American companies, above all DuPont, showed some sensitivity to the
scientific evidence and potential risks, their European counterparts sought “to preserve
market dominance and to avoid for as long as possible the costs of switching to
alternative products.”61 The United Kingdom was a central actor here, and it was not a
coincidence that the export of CFCs played a large role in Britain’s foreign exchange.62
The British government was heavily influenced by Imperial Chemical Industries, among
the largest CFC producers in the world.63 But facing significant public concern, and
regulatory restrictions, major American producers began the process of finding effective
substitutes.64 To be sure, DuPont and other companies also emphasized the tentative and
theoretical nature of the evidence, and lobbied hard against the most aggressive domestic
controls.65 The election of President Reagan in 1980 signaled a period of skepticism
about imposing new restrictions on CFCs, and hence little happened in the period from
1980 to 1982.66 In 1982, in fact, members of the U.S. delegation to an international
negotiations indicated if they had known in 1977 what they now knew, they would have
declined to ban aerosols.67

54

Id. at 44.
Benedick, supra note, at 24.
56
Parson, supra note, at 43.
57
Id at 24.
58
Id. at 25.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 26-27.
61
Id. at 33.
62
Id. at 38-39.
63
See James H. Maxwell and Sanford L. Weiner, Green Consciousness or Dollar Diplomacy? The
British Response to the Threat of Ozone Depletion, 5 International Environmental Affairs 19, 21 (1993).
64
Parson, supra note, at 53.
65
Id. at 57-58.
66
Id. at 58-59.
67
Id. at 114-15.
55
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In 1983, however, the United States started to support international controls,
essentially asking the world to follow its own policies by banning uses of CFCs in
aerosol propellants.68 Notably, the United States did not ask for international action that
would inflict new costs on the nation; it sought an agreement that would replicate its
existing domestic action,69 imposing regulatory burdens on others and thus conferring
benefits on Americans at little or no additional expense. Industry organizations within the
United States initially objected vigorously to the new position, contending that it gave
undue credence to speculative science and fearing the rise of further controls on CFCs.70
While the government maintained its position in the face of these objections, continuing
negotiations produced an international stalemate through 1984.71
In 1985, the United States emphasized that a new theory indicated that truly
catastrophic harm was possible, stemming from a sudden collapse of ozone
concentrations. Because of the worst-case scenario, immediate action would be
desirable.72 Still skeptical of the science, and attuned to the costs, European leaders
continued to reject the effort to produce an international agreement, contending that the
United States was engaged in “scare-mongering”73 and that “Americans had been
panicked into ‘over-hasty measures.’”74 Strikingly, the British government played an
important role in steering public opposition to regulatory controls.75 A relevant fact was
that “a ban on CFCs as aerosol propellants would have imposed economic consequences
for the United Kingdom that would be markedly different from those for the United
States.”76 Because of European skepticism, an international agreement seemed highly
unlikely, with industry favoring the European position.77
B. The Road to Montreal
A great deal changed as a result of the emergence of strengthened scientific
consensus, suggesting that the problem was both more serious and less disputable than
had previously been thought. New findings in 1985 and 1987 showed a “hole” in the
ozone layer over Antarctica, one that had grown to the size of the United States.78 A
paper published in 1985 suggested that between 1957 and 1984, there had been a 40
percent depletion in levels of total column ozone over Antarctica.79 The discovery of the
Antarctica hole “dramatically transformed the politics of the international negotiations as
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well as the science.”80 A significant role was played by the sheer vividness of the
discovery, which “captured the public’s imagination.”81
Equally important, perhaps, were major assessments of the problem from 1986
and 1988. In 1986, a NASA/World Meteorological Association group provided an
exceptionally detailed review of the evidence, concluding that continued growth in CFCs
would produce large losses in the ozone layer.82 In 1988, the Ozone Trends Panel,
established by NASA, reiterated the basic finding that CFCs were the primary cause of
the ozone hole with a new analysis of a significant global trend.83 These conclusions,
generally taken as authoritative, helped to pave the way toward the negotiations that led
to the Montreal Protocol.
Within the United States, the position of industry began to shift in 1986,
apparently as a result of significant progress in producing safe substitutes for CFCs.84
While arguing that CFCs produced no imminent hazard, DuPont supported an
international freeze on CFC emissions, seeing that step as a justified precautionary
measure85 after the discovery of the Antarctic ozone hole.86 Indeed, DuPont and other
producers pledged to phase out production by an early date and also supported
international controls.87 The reasons for this shift remain unclear. It is likely that public
relations concerns played a significant role, especially in light of the fact that the relevant
products were not especially profitable.88 It is also likely that American producers saw
that good commercial opportunities lay in the development and marketing of new
products for which they had a comparative advantage over foreign producers.89 In
support of this hypothesis, consider the companies’ warning “that international
cooperation was essential, and that participation in an agreement to phase out CFCs
needed to be as broad as possible, to avoid production by other manufacturers relocating
to non-signatory states.”90 It is noteworthy in this regard that the European Community
speculated that the Reagan Administration’s support for aggressive controls was driven
by the fact that “U.S. producers had secretly developed substitutes.”91
In December 1986, the international negotiations became increasingly serious.
Within the United States, there was mounting disagreement within the executive branch,
as some officials agreed with the industry suggestion that a freeze might be justified, but
not emissions reductions.92 But the legislative view was unambiguous. By a vote of 80-2,
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the Senate voted in 1987 to ask President Reagan to take aggressive action to protect the
ozone layer.93 The relevant resolution said that the President should “strongly endorse the
United States’ original position . . . and continue to seek aggressively . . . an immediate
freeze . . . a prompt automatic reduction of not less than fifty percent . . . and the virtual
elimination of [ozone-depleting] chemicals.”94
What followed was a period of intense discussions within the Reagan
Administration,95 with sharp differences between the Office of Management and Budget,
skeptical of aggressive controls, and the Environmental Protection Agency, favorably
disposed to such controls.96 The internal disagreement was resolved after a careful costbenefit analysis suggested that the costs of controls would be far lower than anticipated,
and the benefits far higher.97 In the words of a high-level participant in the proceedings:
“A major break . . . came in the form of a cost-benefit study from the President’s Council
of Economic Advisers. The analysis concluded that, despite the scientific and economic
uncertainties, the monetary benefits of preventing future deaths from skin cancer far
outweighed the costs of CFC controls as estimated either by industry or by EPA.”98 This
conclusion was generally in line with the EPA’s own analysis of the problem, in the sense
that both were highly supportive of aggressive controls.99 In particular, both EPA and the
Council of Economic Advisers concluded that the ozone layer depletion would cause a
“staggering” increase in the number of deaths from skin cancer—over five million by
2165.100
Though the formal analysis played a role, “even a qualitative benefit-cost
comparison was sufficient to support regulation,” especially in light of the risk of
“global-scale catastrophic damages.”101 Recall in this connection that skin cancer is a
salient harm, one that is likely to energize citizens and officials alike. The association
between skin cancer and cherished leisure activities—such as lying on the beach—
undoubtedly helped to spur the sense that the problem needed to be addressed in
aggressive terms.
With the American position fixed, the stage was set for the negotiation of a new
protocol. At an early point, the European Community, led above all by France, Italy, and
the United Kingdom, urged caution and a strategy of “wait and learn.”102 Concerned
about the economic position of Imperial Chemical Industries, the United Kingdom
rejected an aggressive approach.103 The United States took the lead in endorsing stringent
additional controls; it was joined by several other nations, including Canada, New
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Zealand, Finland, and Norway.104 Those urging stringent controls placed a particular
emphasis on the problem of irreversibility. Because some CFCs last for a century or
more, it was necessary to act immediately, to avoid the need for “even more costly
measures in the future.”105
Many months of discussions led to the decisive meeting in Montreal, starting on
September 8, 1987 and including over 60 countries, more than half of them
developing.106 The key part of the resulting protocol was not merely a freeze on CFCs,
but a dramatic 50% cut by 1998, accompanied by a freeze on the three major halons,
beginning in 1992.107 The most important factor behind this aggressive step “was the
promotion by an activist fashion of U.S. officials of an extreme negotiating position and
its maintenance through several months of increasingly intense domestic and
international opposition.”108 The 50% figure operated as a compromise between the
American proposal for 95% reductions and the European suggestion of a freeze; it was
also supported by scientific evidence suggesting that minimal ozone depletion would
follow if the 50% reduction were implemented.109
A knotty question involved the treatment of developing countries. While CFC
consumption was low in those countries, their domestic requirements were increasing,110
and a badly designed agreement could merely shift the production and use of CFCs from
wealthy nations to poorer ones, leaving the global problem largely unaffected. On the
other hand, developing nations reasonably contended that they should not be held to the
same controls as wealthier nations, who were responsible for the problem in the first
place. India and China emphasized that nations with less than 25 percent of the world’s
population had been responsible for over 90 percent of the world’s CFCs.111 This claim
was meant by several steps, including both loosened restrictions on developing nations
and financial assistance to them. Under Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol, developing
countries are authorized to meet “basic domestic needs” by increasing to a specified level
for ten years, after which they are subject to a 50 percent reduction for the next ten years.
In addition, a funding mechanism was created by which substantial resources—initially
$400 million—were transferred to poor countries.112 These provisions have been
criticized as unduly vague, essentially a way of deferring key questions113; but they
provided an initial framework, one that has turned out to work exceedingly well.
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C. Costs and Benefits
Why did the United States adopt such an aggressive posture with respect to ozone
depletion? I have referred to the significant effect of a study by the Council of Economic
Advisors, suggesting that a well-designed agreement would give the United States far
more than it would lose. A further clue is provided by the following contemporaneous
account, by the Environmental Protection Agency, of the costs and benefits of the
Montreal Protocol114:
Costs and Benefits of Montreal Protocol to the United States (in billions of 1985 dollars):
Unilateral Implementation of Montreal
No controls
Montreal Protocol
Protocol by the United States
Benefits
—
3,575
1,363
Costs
—
21
21
Net benefits
—
3,554
1,352

These figures were generated by a projection of over five million skin cancer
deaths by 2165, together with over twenty-five million cataract cases by that year—
figures that would be cut to 200,000 and two million, respectively, by a 50% CFC
reduction.115 Of course it is possible to question these numbers; the science does not
allow uncontroversial point estimates here, and perhaps the EPA had an interest in
showing that the agreement was desirable. What matters, however, is the perception of
domestic costs and benefits, and in the late 1980s, no systematic analysis suggested that
the Montreal Protocol was not in the interest of the United States. It should be clear that
on these numbers, even unilateral action was well-justified for the United States, because
the health benefits of American action would create substantial gains for the American
public. But if the world joined the Montreal Protocol, the benefits would be nearly
tripled, because it would prevent 245 million cancers, including more than five million
cancer deaths, by 2100.116 At the same time, the relatively low expected cost of the
Montreal Protocol—a mere $21 billion—dampened both public and private resistance;
and the cost turned out to be even lower than anticipated because of technological
innovation.117
One of the most noteworthy features of the ozone depletion problem is that over
time, the United States was anticipated to be a decreasingly large contributor to that
problem. By 2050, no controls were expected to mean a 15.7% decrease in the ozone
layer—whereas unilateral American action would produce a 10.4% decrease, and the
international agreement would result in a mere 1.9% decrease. By 2100, no controls were
expected to mean a 50% decrease; unilateral action a 49% decrease; and the international
agreement a 1.2% decrease.118 In the short-run, aggressive action by the United States
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alone was amply justified by the domestic cost-benefit calculus. In the long-run, the
United States would do much better with global cooperation, especially from developing
nations, which would be increasingly important sources of ozone-depleting chemicals.
American enthusiasm for the Montreal Protocol, and for aggressive regulatory steps, can
be understood only in this light.
There is no full accounting of the costs and benefits of the Montreal Protocol for
the world. But if we build on a 1997 study in Canada, we can generate the following
numbers as a rough approximation119:
Global Benefits and Costs of Montreal Protocol, 1987–2060
Avoided cases of skin cancer
20,600,000
Avoided cases of skin cancer deaths
333,500
Avoided cases of cataracts
129,100,000
Monetized benefits (including damages to
fisheries, agriculture, and materials; not
$459 billion
including the health benefits mentioned
about)
Monetized benefits in terms of deaths
$333 billion
averted
Monetized health benefits (nonfatal skin
$339 billion
cancers and cataracts averted)
Monetized costs
$235 billion
Net benefits
>$900 billion

To be sure, many of these numbers might be questioned, because they depend on
contentious assumptions.120 But the conclusion is that the Montreal Protocol was an
extraordinary bargain for the world in general, as well as for the United States in
particular. Its success had everything to do with these facts.
This point raises an obvious question: Why was an agreement necessary at all? As
we have seen, severe reductions in CFC emissions preceded the ratification of the
agreement. At first glance, many nations had self-interested motives with respect to the
ozone problem, sufficient to justify large reductions in such emissions.121 If so, an
international accord might not be required at all. It is true that the United States made
substantial reductions on its own, as did other nations, and that still more nations might
have done so without the Montreal Protocol.122 But an agreement was nonetheless
119
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important. As we have seen, the United States itself was much better off with agreement
from other countries, and for many of those countries, the purely domestic cost-benefit
calculus was less clear than it was for the United States. It is plausible to think that
numerous nations were willing to make significant cuts only on the assumption that other
nations would do so as well. Recall that at the time of the Montreal Protocol, European
nations sought a freeze, not a 50% emissions reduction. Perhaps their position was
uninformed by an accurate understanding of the domestic costs and benefits; but the
agreement was nonetheless necessary to ensure significant cuts in CFC emissions.
The posture of the developing nations also helps explain why an agreement was
valuable. For them, cuts were not perceived as justified by reference to the domestic
calculus; side-payments were required. Perhaps it is relevant here that the skin cancer
risks associated with ozone depletion primarily threaten light-skinned people,123 and
hence nations with mostly dark-skinned populations had relatively little to gain from the
agreement. And in understanding why an agreement was necessary, it is relevant that
American producers, such as DuPont, were more enthusiastic about the development of
substitutes on the assumption that there would be an international market for them—and
on the assumption that they would not be losing, and might even be gaining, in the global
marketplace by virtue of their efforts to produce CFC substitutes. The final point is that
an international process, culminating in the Montreal Protocol, helped to spread relevant
information about both costs and benefits, spurring nations to take notice of a problem
that some of them might have neglected on their own.
None of this means that the problem of ozone depletion presented a standard
prisoner’s dilemma, in which all or most nations needed an enforceable agreement to
produce a result better than what would emerge from purely self-interested action. The
ozone problem had no such structure. As we have seen, the United States essentially
complied with the requirements of the Montreal Protocol before the Montreal Protocol,
and many nations went well beyond those requirements both before and after the
protocol.124 There was no incentive to defect. But the agreement was certainly in the
interest of the United States, because it greatly increased the health benefits for the
nation’s citizens, and at least some of the parties would not have reduced at all or as
much on their own.
Perhaps it is relevant here that the skin cancer risks associated with ozone
depletion primarily threaten like-skinned people, and hence nations with mostly darkskinned populations had relatively little to gain from the agreement. On this count, the
problem of climate change is altogether different.
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D. Beyond Montreal
After the Montreal Protocol, restrictions on ozone-depleting substances have been
rapidly strengthened,125 to the point where a world-wide phase-out of fifteen different
CFCs was accepted in London in 1990.126 At that stage, the European Community, now
convinced, sought a clear timetable for further reductions, leading to an agreement for
total elimination of CFC use and production by 2000.127 Imperial Chemical Industries, an
original source of the British and hence European skepticism about regulatory controls,
now played a different role, having “realized—even more strongly than before—the
potential commercial opportunities, as well as the risks, involved in shifting to substitute
chemicals.”128
Remarkably, the European Community announced that it would phase out CFCs
by 1997. Not to be outdone, the United States announced that it would do so by 1996.
The accelerated action was spurred by evidence that the costs of the phase-out would be
much lower than expected—and that the damage to the ozone layer was even greater.
Action to control ozone-depleting chemicals has increased since that time, to the point
where almost all nations have agreed to it. As a result of the various restrictions, new
damage to the ozone layer has essentially ceased; the ozone “hole” is shrinking; and
ozone concentrations are expected to return to natural levels by 2050.129 This, then, is a
stunning story of successful international cooperation.
If we examine the American role here, we can see that the development of the
Montreal Protocol is a distinctive and striking case study in a well-known phenomenon in
the political science literature, which involves the provision of public goods by
international powers, or “hegemons.”130 On this view, the most powerful nations are
often in a good position to provide global public goods, such as financial stability and
peace, entirely on their own. Consider protection against terrorist threats: If the United
States succeeds in reducing those threats, it might well benefit many nations, not simply
the United States.131 The domestic actions of the United States—significantly reducing
CFC emissions before any international requirements—conferred substantial benefits on
other nations (though admittedly, those benefits might be characterized as a reduction of
harm). And in pressing successfully for aggressive action at the international level, the
United States provided large health benefits to citizens all over the globe.
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II. Climate Change
Concern about greenhouse gases has arisen in the same general period as concern
about ozone-depleting chemicals. But there is an initial puzzle: In the two contexts, many
of the major actors have reversed their positions. The best example is the United States,
at once the most important agent behind the Montreal Protocol and among the most
important obstacles to an international agreement to govern greenhouse gases.132 For
ozone depletion, the United States first acted unilaterally, and then sought international
restrictions. For greenhouse gases, the United States has hardly acted unilaterally. On the
contrary, international action came first, and has spurred the exceedingly modest
domestic measures that are now on the books.133
For their part, European nations were significant obstacles to international
regulation of ozone-depleting chemicals, favoring an approach of “wait and learn”; for
climate change, they have been favorably disposed toward regulatory controls, with the
United Kingdom in the forefront.134 The reversal of positions suggests that it is
inadequate to portray the United States as skeptical of global solutions to environmental
problems, or to see the European Union as more committed to environmental goals. Nor
is it adequate to portray the American position on greenhouse gases as entirely a function
of Republican leadership. The difference depends instead on assessments of national
interest, public opinion, and the role of powerful private actors.135
A. From Framework to Kyoto
Since the late 1980s, international organizations have shown a great deal of
concern about climate change. The initial activity occurred in December 1988, when a
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly declared climate change to be a
“common concern of mankind” and asked for a global response.136 In 1989, the European
Community signaled that it would support an international agreement to deal with the
problem. In 1992, more than 180 nations, including the United States, signed the
Framework Convention on Climate Change during the Rio Conference on Environment
and Development.137 In fact the United States was the first industrialized nation to ratify
the Framework Convention,138 which set the stage for everything that has happened since.
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Unlike the Montreal Protocol, the Framework Convention lacked quantitative
limits for emissions reductions; the absence of such restrictions had everything to do with
the posture of the United States, which strongly resisted them,139 here occupying the
place of the United Kingdom in the early stages of the debate over ozone-depleting
chemicals. The Framework Convention generally limited itself to information-gathering
requirements and general aspirations, calling in abstract terms for stabilization of
emissions to prevent “dangerous interference” with global climate. Thus the convention
urged that it would be desirable to “return by the end of the present decade to earlier
levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.” The
parties agreed to produce, at a latter stage, a legal instrument that would establish
quantitative limits for developing countries. The Convention was ratified by the United
States Senate in 1992 and entered into force two years later.
The Framework Convention inaugurated a new process of meetings, to be held
annually. In 1995, the parties to the convention (including the United States, now led by
President Clinton) met in Berlin and agreed to set emissions limits at specific periods and
to agree to a protocol that would embody those limits.140 The Clinton Administration
appeared to support the “Berlin Mandate,” asking industrialized nations to accept
restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions. But other national leaders were not enthusiastic
about this commitment. In 1997 a unanimous Senate adopted Senate Resolution 98,
which asked President Clinton not to agree to limits on greenhouse gas emissions if the
agreement would injure the economic interests of the United States or if it would
“mandate[] new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period” as for the
United States.141 Indeed, the unanimous Senate concluded that any “exemption for
Developing Country Parties is inconsistent with the need for global action on climate
change and is environmentally flawed” and indicated that it “strongly believed” that the
proposals under consideration “could result in serious harm to the United States
economy, including significant job loss, trade disadvantages, increased energy and
consumer costs, or any combination thereof.”142 (Recall that a near-unanimous Senate
had voted in favor of aggressive action to protect the ozone lawyer—and that a
unanimous Senate voted to support a more rapid phase-out of CFCs than was required by
the Montreal Protocol and its amendment.143)
This was an exceedingly important resolution—even more important than it might
have seemed. Because such commitments from developing countries were highly
unlikely—indeed, no commitments “within the same compliance period” had been made
even for the Montreal Protocol144—this vote was essentially a suggestion that the United
States should accept no commitments at all. It is worth underlining the bipartisan nature
of the vote; no Democratic member of the Senate opposed it. As we shall see, the
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opposition of developing countries stemmed from a calculation overlapping with that of
the Senate. To be sure, it was possible for such countries to urge that wealthy nations had
been responsible for the problem in the first instance, and that they should not have to
bear significant costs when wealthy nations had already benefited from the technologies
that contribute to climate change. This argument – invoking corrective justice, but with a
distributional component – was not made and could not be made by the United States.
But developing countries also believed, not without reason, that they would lose more
than they would gain from restrictions on greenhouse gases. As we shall see, China was
and remains the most important actor here. China stands to lose relatively little from
climate change, and it would have to spend a great deal to reduce greenhouse gases145;
hence China’s reluctance to participate in an international accord parallels the analysis of
the United States.
The Clinton Administration took an equivocal approach to this resolution and
indeed to the Kyoto negotiations in general. In part because of the presence of Vice
President Gore, the administration did favor some kind of international response.146
Nonetheless, it spoke at some points in favor of voluntary responses rather than
regulation and adopted negotiating positions that would impose relatively little burden on
the national economy.147 In the complex Kyoto negotiations in December 1997, the
United States did support regulatory limits, but relatively modest ones, arguing against
reductions in emissions levels and instead for stabilizing current levels.148 (Again this
posture is a sharp contrast from the negotiations that led to the Montreal Protocol, in
which the United States sought significant reductions, while other nations urged
stabilization.) The United States also urged several other steps: inclusion of the
developing countries in the treaty, through their acceptance of some kind of quantitative
limits; a rejection of early deadlines in favor of a ten-year delay; and a base year of 1995
rather than 1990, which would make quantitative limits less stringent. The United States
also opposed mandatory “domestic measures,” such as energy taxes,149 and sought ample
mechanisms to ensure emissions trading, a sensible idea that would have the advantage
driving down costs. The restrictions supported by the United States were distinctly less
aggressive than those sought by the European Union and Japan.150 In conformity with
Senate Resolution 98, American negotiators made serious efforts to persuade the major
developing countries to agree to limit their emissions at some future date; they refused.151
In fact many of the American positions were rejected during the negotiations.
Ultimately, most of the major developed nations, including the United States, agreed to
the Kyoto Protocol, which sets forth firm quantitative limits on greenhouse gas
emissions. Specified reductions were listed for, and limited to, the “Annex 1” nations—
those bound by the Kyoto Protocol. The list was designed to ensure that taken as a whole,
the nations would show a reduction of 5 percent over 1990 levels—a reduction that must
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be met in the period between 2008 and 2012. For example, the United States was
required to reduce emission by 7 percent; Japan by 6 percent; the European Union by 8
percent. Some nations were permitted to have increased emissions; these included
Iceland, Norway, and Australia. Developing nations made no commitments at all, though
they were permitted to engage in emissions trading with Annex 1 nations.
It is worth asking why, exactly, these particular targets were chosen. The simplest
answer is that national self-interest played a key role.152 The point is most obviously true
for developing nations. India’s greenhouse gas emissions exceed Germany’s; those of
South Korea exceed France; next to the United States, China is the largest emitter of
greenhouse gases in the world.153 But none of these nations is controlled by the Kyoto
Protocol. Russia was given a target of 100 percent of its 1990 emissions, but in 1997, its
actual emissions were already merely 70 percent of that amount, because of economic
difficulties. The trading system created by the Kyoto Protocol actually ensured a huge
economic boon to Russia, as everyone was aware.154 Germany appeared to accept a
significant reductions requirement—8 percent by 2012—but in 1997, its own emissions
were already 10 percent lower than 1990, as a result of reunification with the former East
Germany, whose plummeting economy resulted in radical emissions decreases.155 For the
United Kingdom, the story is not altogether different. The target, a reduction of 8 percent,
was less severe than it seemed, because state subsidization of natural gas had already led,
in 1997, to a level 5 percent below that of 1990.156 The real loser, in terms of the actual
costs of mandatory cuts, was the United States.
It should therefore be unsurprising that in the United States, a strong bipartisan
consensus stood in opposition to ratification; no member of the Senate, Democratic or
Republican, supported ratification. Although Vice President Gore played a key role in
producing the Kyoto Protocol, the Clinton Administration took an ambivalent approach
in the aftermath of negotiations. On the one hand, it emphasized the flexible nature of
some of the provisions—including emissions trading—and urged that developing
countries might eventually be persuaded to be included.157 On the other hand, the Clinton
Administration promised Congress that it would not adopt measures to implement the
Kyoto Protocol before Senate ratification and that it would not seek such ratification
unless it had obtained “meaningful participation” from developing countries.158 Under
intense international pressure, the United States signed the protocol on September 12,
1998.159 But it is an understatement to say that the signing was not well-received in
Congress, which added a proviso to the 1999 Environmental Protection Agency
Appropriations Act banning the agency to use appropriations “to propose or issue rules,
regulations, decrees or orders for the purpose of implementation, or in preparation for
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implementation” of the Kyoto Protocol.160 At this point, Vice President Gore himself
indicated that the protocol would not be submitted for ratification without meaningful
participation by developing nations.161 Indeed the whole process had an air of unreality to
it, because “everyone on both sides of the Atlantic already knew in 1997 that the U.S.
could never join the protocol as drafted.”162
The Bush Administration offered no such ambivalent picture. In 2001, President
Bush described the Kyoto Protocol as “fatally flawed” and “effectively dead,”
emphasizing the nonparticipation of developing countries. In the key letter, President
Bush wrote, “I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the world,
including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would
cause serious harm to the U.S. economy.”163 In fact the United States attempted to
persuade other nations, above all Japan and Russia, to reject the protocol as well.164 In
addition, the United States has done exceedingly little to reduce the emission of
greenhouse gases, relying largely on collecting information about emissions levels and
encouraging further research.165 One of the nation’s principal goals is an 18%
improvement in greenhouse gas intensity between 2002 and 2012,166 with intensity
measured as emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP). But the goal is an
aspiration, not a requirement,167 and in any case significant reductions in greenhouse gas
intensity can be accompanied by extremely large increases in greenhouse gas
emissions.168
Nonetheless, the Kyoto Protocol went into effect in 2005, and the number of
nations formally committed to it is impressive indeed. Of the original participants in the
process that led to Kyoto, the United States and Australia are the only nonratifiers. In
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2001, the Marrakech accords led to further innovations, in which developing countries
were made beneficiaries of funds to assist with technology transfer.169 Although the level
of the funds remain unspecified, donors led by the European Union pledged to grant $410
million annually.170 To this extent, the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol might
appear to be roughly parallel. But the appearance is badly misleading, as we shall shortly
see.
B. Costs and Benefits
For the United States and the world, the benefits of the Montreal Protocol were
projected to dwarf the costs. What are the relevant figures for the Kyoto Protocol?
Begin with the United States, focusing on the cost side. At the time of ratification,
this was a much-disputed question. An early analysis in the Clinton Administration found
“modest” costs from the Kyoto Protocol, producing a mere $.04 to $.06 increase in the
price of gasoline, and an annual increase in the average family’s energy bill of $70-$110
by 2010.171 Within the Clinton Administration itself, however, these projections were
disputed. A study by the Department of Energy projected substantial gasoline price
increases from $1.39 to $1.91, and 20 percent to 86 percent increases in the price of
electricity by 2010.172 Compare in this regard an industry-funded study done at the
Wharton School, which projected costs far in excess of these projections173—including a
loss of 2.4 million jobs and $300 billion in the nation’s GDP, with an average annual cost
of $2700 per household, including a 65 cent per gallon increase in the price of gasoline
and a near-doubling of the price of energy and electricity.174
These figures are almost certainly inflated. One of the most careful, objective, and
influential analyses comes from William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer.175 As Nordhaus
and Boyer show, a great deal depends on the amount of emissions trading. If trading were
freely available, the cost to American companies would be dramatically reduced, because
they could avoid expensive emissions reduction requirements and rely instead on
purchasing permits.176 Additional uncertainty about the numbers stems from the fact that
technological innovation might drive down costs—as indeed it did in the context of
CFCs.177 According to Nordhaus and Boyer, the worst-case scenario for the Kyoto
Protocol, involving no effective trading, would produce total costs of $852 billion in
present value.178 The best case, involving global trading, would involve a cost of $91
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billion.179 The most likely figure is $325 billion, involving trading among the Annex 1
nations.180
For the world as a whole, however, the costs are actually lower—merely $217
billion in the case of Annex 1 trading, and $884 billion in the case of no trading.181 The
reason is that many nations, especially those in Eastern Europe, would receive a great
deal of money from permit sales, and hence they would count as net winners quite apart
from any benefits from reducing global warming. The mere grant of permits produces
tens of billions of dollars in gains for both Russia and Europe—a total of $112 billion
from Annex I trading.182 It is a real question whether these billions of dollars in revenue,
amounting to a kind of transfer, should count as a “benefit” from the Kyoto Protocol. But
even if such amounts are included, the worldwide costs of the protocol are in the
hundreds of billions of dollars.
What would the United States and the world receive in return for these costs?
Here too there is a great deal of uncertainty.183 In its 2001 report, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change projected an increase of between 1.4 and 5.8 degrees
Centigrade by 2001184—and an increase of 1.4 degrees would cause far less damage than
an increase of 5.8 degrees. To these points it must be added that specialists greatly
disagree about the likely damage from climate change, even assuming a particular
increase in global mean temperatures.185 If climate change is abrupt, the cost will be far
higher than otherwise; abrupt climate change may lead to worldwide catastrophe.186 The
magnitude of the risk of catastrophe is disputed, and any such risk must be made part of
the overall analysis.187 In addition, a great deal turns on the selection of the discount rate;
because many of the gains from emissions reductions will be experienced in the future, a
low discount rate will obviously mean higher benefits from risk reduction than a high
one.188
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According to an influential estimate, however, the present worldwide cost of
climate change is projected to be in the vicinity of four trillion dollars.189 That cost should
be put in perspective; the annual GDP of the United States is $10 trillion, suggesting a
capital stock value of at least $100 trillion.190 But four trillions dollars is a great deal, and
even that figure may be far too low if climate change is abrupt.191 According to other
estimates, climate change will reduce the GDP of developed nations by one or two
percent, and reduce the GDP of developing nations by five percent or more.192 It is
difficult to doubt the proposition that the Kyoto Protocol would be worthwhile if it would
eliminate the total cost of climate change. But the agreement would actually have a
meager effect, reducing anticipated warming by a mere 0.03 C by 2100.193 The reason is
that climate change is a function of aggregate emissions of greenhouse gases, and the
Kyoto Protocol would have only a small effect on those aggregate emissions. There are
three points here. First, China, India, and other developing countries—now substantial
contributors to climate change, and anticipated to be larger contributors in the near
future—are not included in the agreement at all. Second, past emissions of greenhouse
gases will contribute to warming; it follows that even a substantial reduction in future
emissions would not eliminate the problem. Third, the Kyoto Protocol requires the parties
not to make substantial cuts in emissions, but merely to return to a point slightly below
emissions levels in 1990. It is for these reasons that its contribution to the problems
caused by climate change are anticipated to be small.
What are the anticipated effects of the agreement for the United States? The initial
point is that the most serious damage from climate change is most unlikely to be felt in
the United States.194 On some estimates, American agriculture will actually be a net
winner as a result of climate change.195 On other estimates, Americans will be net losers,
but not nearly to the same extent as other nations.196 In this light, we can offer a plausible
if rough projection of the costs and benefits of the Kyoto Protocol for the United States
alone197:
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Costs and Benefits of Kyoto Protocol for the United States (in billions of 2000 dollars):
No
Kyoto
Unilateral Action to Comply with
Controls
Protocol
Kyoto Protocol
Benefits
—
12
0198
Costs
—
325
325
Net Benefits
—
–313
–325

It should be immediately clear that on these numbers, the Kyoto Protocol is not a
good bargain for the United States. The anticipated benefits of $12 billion are hardly
trivial, but they are dwarfed by the anticipated costs of $325 billion. For the United
States, significant unilateral action to comply with the Kyoto Protocol may well produce
no benefits at all, and it would not be easy to defend in cost-benefit terms. If the United
States engaged in emissions reduction on its own, it would be taking extremely costly
action for speculative benefits. To say this is not to say that unilateral action would have
no rationale.199 Perhaps such action could spur technological innovation in a way that
would have substantial long-term consequences for the problem of climate change—and
do so at a cost lower than what is now anticipated. As we have seen, something of this
sort did happen with ozone depletion, as substitutes developed more rapidly, and more
cheaply, than anyone expected.200 But for climate change, any such strategy would be a
gamble, and it would not be the simplest to defend in conventional terms.
The larger point is that for the United States, the perceived values presented a
very different picture for the Kyoto Protocol than for the Montreal Protocol. The costs of
the Kyoto Protocol were much higher than the costs of the Montreal Protocol (by some
$313 billion), and the benefits of the former were much lower than the benefits of the
later (by some $3,562 billion!). For the world as a whole, the picture is better, but not
particularly good, and not nearly as good as that for the Montreal Protocol:
Costs and Benefits of Kyoto Protocol for the World (in Billions of 2000 Dollars)
No Controls
Kyoto Protocol
Benefits
—
96
338 or 217 (if we include, as offsetting
Costs
—
benefits, $112 billion in permits for Eastern
Europe)
Net Benefits
—
–242 or –119

To be sure, these numbers must be taken with many grains of salt, depending as
they do on contentious assumptions about the degree of emissions trading, about
technological innovation, about discount rates, about the likelihood of abrupt or
catastrophic warming, and about the valuation of life and health. Reasonable people
might expect the costs to be significantly lower or offer a significantly higher estimate of
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the benefits. If climate change is abrupt, or if temperatures raise more sharply than
anticipated, the benefits of the Kyoto Protocol will be higher than these numbers suggest.
Perhaps the Kyoto Protocol would have served, and might still serve, as a start toward a
broader and more inclusive agreement. But on the numbers that confronted the United
States at the pertinent times, the argument for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was
certainly unclear—far more so than the argument for ratification of the Montreal
Protocol.
If all of the relevant facts are taken together, it is possible to explain why the
United States was skeptical of the Kyoto Protocol. But a mystery remains: Why did so
many nations express enthusiasm for it? Why was the Kyoto Protocol possible at all? We
already have some clues. Part of the answer undoubtedly involves an assessment of
domestic costs and benefits—an assessment that uniquely unfavorable for the United
States. Many nations undoubtedly had more to gain than to lose (consider Eastern
European nations, which acquired valuable emissions licenses). Some of the nations that
appeared to make ambitious promises, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, did no
such thing. To be sure, it is possible that some such nations were acting as global
altruists. Perhaps some of them had an unusually pessimistic account of the consequences
of climate change; perhaps some, or many, believed that the Kyoto Protocol would
initiate a set of agreements that would, in the end, do far more good than harm. But
perhaps some nations, especially those with the most to lose, did not believe that the
Kyoto Protocol would, in fact, prove to be binding. On this view, the agreement was a
kind of “cheap talk”—a way of signaling a commitment that would not operate as a
commitment in practice. Let us now explore some evidence for this view.
C. Notes on Practice
The Kyoto Protocol has been ratified by all of the Annex1 nations except the
United States and Australia. But this simple fact is insufficiently informative. Moreover,
it is impossible to come to terms with the conflicting American approaches to the two
problems without exploring actual American practices. The key points here are that the
United States is the world’s leading contributor to climate change and that greenhouse
gas emissions have been growing, not stabilizing, in recent years. Let us begin with some
general numbers about national performance.
1. Greenhouse gas emissions in the world. The formal fact of ratification
disguises a quite complex practice. Numerous nations are very far from their targets
under the Kyoto Protocol. Begin with the EEC countries201:
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EEC Countries
Country

Target

Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom

–13%
–7.50%
–21%
0
0
–21%
25%
13%
–6.50%
–28%
–6%
27%
15%
4%
–12.50%

% Change in Emissions
between 1990 and 2003
16.50%
1.30%
6.80%
21.50%
–1.90%
–18.20%
25.80%
25.60%
11.50%
–16.10%
1.50%
36.70%
41.70%
–2.30%
–13%

Compliant?
no
no
no
no
yes
almost
almost
no
no
no
no
no
no
yes
almost

Note that compliance is not required until some time between 2008 and 2012
(with the precise date varying by country); hence widespread noncompliance does not
foreclose the possibility that the situation will be better when the actual due dates arrive.
Nonetheless, Sweden and France (with its heavy reliance on nuclear power) are the only
nations in the EEC that have already met their targets under the Kyoto Protocol. The
current numbers, and the existing trends, suggest that it is highly likely that a majority of
EEC nations will fail to meet their obligations. There is a large contrast here with the
Montreal Protocol, for which compliance is essentially perfect. To be sure, the United
Kingdom, Germany, and Greece are close to their targets; we have seen the explanation
for the first two. The more important point is that the vast majority of nations are very far
from what Kyoto requires, often showing increases where they should be showing
reductions.
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Now consider Annex I countries202:
Annex 1 Countries
Target

% Change in Emissions
between 1990 and 2003

Bulgaria
Czech Republic
EEC
Estonia
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Monaco
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Switzerland

–8%
–8%
–8%
–8%
–8%
–8%
–8%
–8%
–8%
–8%
–8%
–8%

–50%
–24.20%
–1.40%
–50.80%
–58.50%
5.30%
–66.20%
30%
–46.10%
–28.30%
–1.90%
–0.40%

United States

–7%

13.34%

Canada
Hungary
Japan
Poland
Croatia
New Zealand
Russian Federation
Ukraine
Norway

–6%
–6%
–6%
–6%
–5%
0
0
0
1%

24.20%
–31.90%
12.80%
–34.40%
–6%
22.50%
–38.50%
–46.20%
9.30%

Australia

8%

23.30%

Iceland

10%

–8.20%

Country

Compliant?
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
no
yes
yes
no
no
no—refuses to
ratify
no
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
no
no–refuses to
ratify
yes

The most remarkable fact presented here is that while the United States is one of
only two Annex 1 nations that have declined to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, a number of
countries show emissions increases comparable to or higher than those of the United
States. These include Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Austria, Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
Spain, and Italy. It is true that substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions can be
found in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland,
Russia, Ukraine, Iceland, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany.203
But most of these nations are in Central and Eastern Europe, which has suffered serious
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economic distress in the relevant period. That distress accounts for substantially lower
levels of energy use and hence lower levels of emissions, in fact an overall reduction of
37 percent in the relevant period.204
Because of the latter figure, the good news is that from 1990 to 2003, greenhouse
gas emissions from Annex I parties did decrease by 5.9 percent, or a total of 18.4 billion
tons—an average decrease in line with the Kyoto target.205 But it is important to be
careful with this figure. It is true that the average decrease, under that target, is 5.2
percent, but Kyoto’s distribution of targets among nations would produce far greater
overall decreases than those captured by the immediately preceding table. The reason is
that the decreases have occurred in nations with already low emissions rates, while the
nations with high emissions rates (above all the United States) are generally increasing,
not decreasing, their emissions. By 2010, overall emissions from wealthy nations may
grow by as much as 17% from 2000.206 In view of the likely increase in wealthy nations,
and because the economies of Eastern European nations are recovering, Kyoto’s goals are
most unlikely to be met.207
An important qualification to the figures just given: The behavior of nations might
well be interdependent, and whether nations are willing to make significant reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions might be endogenous to the behavior of the United States in
particular. If the world’s leading emitter is unwilling to make reductions, other nations
might be reluctant to do so. We do not have a clean test of how nations would behave if
the United States were willing to alter its own practices. Let us now turn, in that light, to
those practices.
2. Greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. For the United States, practices
in the last decade will make compliance with Kyoto’s goals, or anything like them, even
more challenging than it would have been at an earlier stage. The reason is that by most
measures, energy use has been moving in exactly the wrong directions.
Within the United States, greenhouse gas emissions increased by no less than 15.8
percent between 1990 and 2004.208 In 1990, carbon dioxide emissions were 5,002.3
million metric tons; in 2004, they were 5.973.0 million metric tons, a jump of 19
percent.209 To be sure, greenhouse gas intensity—understood as emissions per unit of
Gross Domestic Product—has been decreasing in the same period, with a significant
decline of 21%.210 But because of increased energy usage, per capita emissions have
actually increased over this period by 1.2%—an increase that, alongside population
growth, produced the increase in aggregate emissions.211
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Fossil fuel combustion is by far the largest contributor to greenhouse gas
emissions in the United States, accounting for well over ninety-five percent of total
carbon dioxide emissions. Greenhouse gas emissions from this source has been growing
in most sectors, with a 1.7% increase between 2003 and 2004.212 The transportation
sector, based on fossil fuels, accounts for over a quarter of emissions, and it is the most
rapidly growing source.213 While methane emissions were reduced by 10% in 2004, total
greenhouse gas emissions increased by 1.7% in the same year, the largest increase on
record from any nation.214 The most important conclusion of this capsule summary is that
if the United States were to attempt to meet the target set by the Kyoto Protocol—a 7
percent reduction in emissions since 1990—it would have to impose exceedingly
aggressive regulatory restrictions, for the simple reason that existing emissions are
substantially in excess of 1990 levels, and growing every year.
III. Lessons and Implications
What follows from an understanding of the extraordinary success of the Montreal
Protocol and substantial failure of the Kyoto Protocol? There are only two data points
here, and it is therefore important to be careful in drawing general conclusions. But it is
noteworthy that the Montreal Protocol was produced and ratified under a Republican
President, not known for his commitment to environmental protection, and that a
unanimous Senate voted for ratification. It is noteworthy as well that the Kyoto Protocol
produced an ambivalent reaction under a Democratic President, who sought less
ambitious targets than those favored by other nations, and that the Senate was
unanimously opposed to it. For these reasons, both tales are legitimately taken as
exemplary. They fit with other accounts in domains that are both related215 and quite
different216; those accounts emphasize the centrality of domestic self-interest in national
judgments with respect to whether to join, or to comply with, international obligations.
Nothing in the discussion here demonstrates that domestic self-interest is the sole
motivation for government behavior; but there is no question that it plays a significant
role.217 As suggestive evidence, consider the fact that a “revealed preference” study of
American laws suggests that a non-American life is valued at 1/2000 an American life.218
We can sharpen the distinction between the two protocols by offering a more
general point. Some international agreements can solve prisoner’s dilemmas, by enabling
nations to make binding promises to undertake action that no individual nation, or few
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individual nations, would undertake on their own.219 At first glance, the problems of
ozone depletion and climate change might seem to have this structure. But neither the
Montreal Protocol nor the Kyoto Protocol solves a prisoner’s dilemma. As we have seen,
unilateral compliance with the requirements of the Montreal Protocol was in the interest
of the United States, and probably many other nations as well. Hence the United States
and many others would rationally do as the Montreal Protocol required even if no other
nation did so. By contrast, the Kyoto Protocol solved no prisoner’s dilemma for the
United States. On the contrary, compliance with the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol
would probably make Americans worse off, even if such compliance ensured that all
other parties complied as well.220
If all of the relevant figures are taken as a whole, however, it would be possible to
offer the following objection to my emphasis on the importance of domestic self-interest
to the decisions of the United States. Neither the Montreal Protocol nor the Kyoto
Protocol presented a clear example of a case in which the interests of the United States
sharply diverged from the interests of the world. The Montreal Protocol was strongly in
both the national and international interest. According to some of the most influential
numbers, the Kyoto Protocol was neither in the nation’s interest nor in the world’s
interest. It would therefore seem consistent with American behavior in the two areas to
say not that the United States follows its own domestic analysis, but the United States
will not sign a costly agreement that is not in the world’s interest. On that view, the two
tales do not speak to the importance of domestic self-interest; they are consistent with the
view that the United States operates as a kind of global altruist.
It is true that neither protocol presented an example of a case in which the United
States based its decision on domestic consequences even though global consequences
argued for a very different outcome. But the deliberations that led to both decisions
demonstrate the centrality of the domestic calculation. We have seen that for the
Montreal Protocol, a purely domestic analysis by the Council of Economic Advisers
played a crucial role, and that low domestic costs, spurred by technical innovation, made
the Montreal Protocol far more attractive than it would otherwise be. The economic
analysis focused on the domestic costs and benefits, not the global costs and benefits.221
We have also seen that the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol had everything to do with a
perception of high domestic costs and low domestic benefits (because of the
nonparticipation of developing nations). At the key points, American officials in the
executive and legislative branches may not have been thinking solely of domestic
consequences; but those consequences were the principal motivating force behind the
different outcomes.
What lessons might be drawn from these tales?
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A. Public Opinion and Consumer Behavior
The first lesson is that public opinion greatly matters, at least if it is reflected in
actual behavior.222 Recall that the problem of ozone depletion received massive attention
in the United States, and that American consumers responded by greatly reducing their
consumption of aerosol sprays containing CFCs. This action softened industry opposition
to regulation,223 in part because it made regulatory controls far less costly than they
would otherwise be. In addition, market pressures fed by consumer behavior can spur
technological innovation. If environmentally unfriendly products are not popular in the
market, industry is likely to respond with safer substitutes. In this sense, markets
themselves can be technology-forcing, in the environmental domain as elsewhere. At the
same time, public opinion put a great deal of pressure on public officials, affecting the
behavior of legislators and the White House alike.224
By contrast, there was no public pressure on those involved it CFC production
and use in Europe, certainly in the early stages. The absence of such pressure, combined
with the efforts of well-organized private groups, helped to ensure that European nations
would take a weak stand on the question of regulation, at least at the inception of
negotiations. In the later stages, public opinion and consumer behavior were radically
transformed in the United Kingdom and in Europe, and the transformation had large
effects on the approach of political leaders in the United Kingdom and Europe as well.225
Note in this regard that public opinion may or may not be justified by actual threats. In
some domains, the public has been far more fearful than the facts warrant.226 With respect
to ozone depletion, public opinion did in fact track scientific understandings, or at least
the understandings that turned out to be vindicated.
With respect to climate change, the attitude of the United States remains
remarkably close to that of pre-Montreal Europe, urging an approach of “wait and learn,”
above all through research and voluntary action, rather than through emission reduction
mandates.227 It is true that between 1990 and the present, the problem of climate change
has received a great deal of media attention in the United States. But the public has yet to
respond to that attention through consumer choices, and the best evidence suggests that
American citizens are not, in fact, greatly concerned about the risks associated with
warmer climates.228 Notwithstanding the publicity given to climate change in recent
years, Americans recently ranked the environment twelfth on a list of the most important
problems—below immigration, health care, and gas and heating oil prices. Among
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environmental problems, climate change was ranked ninth, well below damage to the
ozone layer.229 Another recent poll found that strong majorities of Americans oppose an
increase in taxes on electricity and gasoline as an attempt to reduce climate change.230
Unlike in the context of depletion of the ozone layer, American consumers and voters are
putting little pressure on either markets or officials.
None of this means that public opinion is so firm and fixed that public officials
have no room to maneuver. On the contrary, there is reason to think that public opinion is
malleable on this topic, especially in light of general enthusiasm for the Kyoto Protocol.
But with respect to greenhouse gases, the unaggressive posture of the United States
government has been consistent with the attitudes of American citizens. A salient
incident—a kind of 9/11 for climate change—might be sufficient to change those
attitudes; perhaps it is necessary as well.231 Recall in this connection that public opinion
with respect to ozone depletion was affected by the salience of skin cancer and by the
discovery of an ozone “hole” over Antarctica. To date, there is no analogue in the context
of climate change.
B. American Benefits, American Costs
The second lesson is that many international agreements for global environmental
problems will be ineffective without the participation of the United States, and the United
States is likely to participate only if the domestic benefits are perceived to be at least in
the general domain of the domestic costs. In international law generally, the latter point is
hardly novel,232 though it is disputed in its strongest forms.233 My modest suggestion here
is that for global environmental problems, above all climate change, no international
agreement is likely to be effective unless the United States can be persuaded that it will
not lose much more than it will gain.
It is true that the United States accounts of only about one-fifth of global
greenhouse gas emissions—a stunning per capita figure, but one that is not high enough
to derail international action if other nations are willing to go forward without the United
States. If the world were able to make significant cuts in what is 80 percent of total
emissions, it could do a great deal about climate change. The problem is that if the United
States stands to one side, it is almost certain that coordinated, aggressive action will be
impossible. At Kyoto, China and India showed an unwillingness to commit to cuts even
when the United States suggested that it would participate. Those nations, and other
developing countries, will likely be reluctant to confer benefits on industrialized nations,
including the United States, unless there is a degree of reciprocity, and perhaps
significant side payments as well (as in the Montreal Protocol).234
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As we shall soon see, China will be the world’s largest contributor to greenhouse
gases by 2025, and it would be surprising if China showed a willingness to make
significant cuts without the participation of the United States.235 The only possibility is if
China, in the future, finds itself in something like the same position with respect to
climate change as the United States occupied with respect to the ozone layer—gravely
threatened by the very emissions from which it profits. If China perceives itself as
seriously endangered by climate change, it might well be willing to scale back its
emissions, because domestic self-interest might so require. But this is unlikely; let us now
see why.
C. Contributors and Victims
Who has the most to lose from reductions in greenhouse gases, and who has the
most to gain from such reductions? To see the prospects for some kind of parallel to the
Montreal Protocol, it is necessary to answer this question. Four possibilities can be
imagined: some nations might both contribute substantially to the problem and stand to
lose a great deal from it; some might contribute little while standing to lose little; some
might contribute a great deal while standing to lose little; and some might contribute little
while standing to lose great deal. The most promising situation for an international accord
would be one in which those who contribute most to the problem also have the most to
lose. If so, they would face a strong incentive to scale back their emissions. The least
promising situation would be one in which the major contributors also have little to lose.
If so, they would have a weak incentive to do anything about the problem.
Here is a relevant estimate of anticipated losses236:
Damages of a 2.5 Degree Warming as a Percent of GDP
India

4.93

Africa

3.91

OECD Europe

2.83

High income OPEC

1.95

Eastern Europe

0.71

Japan

0.50

United States

0.45

China

0.22

Russia

–0.65

It is readily apparent that some nations are far more vulnerable than others.
Strikingly, Russia stands to be a net gainer, with substantial benefits to agriculture. India
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is particularly vulnerable; nations in Africa also stand to lose a great deal. A central
reason is that India is expected to have devastating losses in terms of both health and
agriculture; for Africa, the major problem involves health, with a massive anticipated
increase in climate-related diseases.237 In light of these figures, we might therefore expect
that Russia would not be especially enthusiastic about controls of greenhouse gas
emissions—except, perhaps, is an emissions trading system ensured that Russia would
gain a great deal of money from those controls (as the Kyoto system in fact does). The
United States faces limited threats to agriculture and health. Like Russia, China is
projected to benefit in terms of agriculture, and while it will suffer health losses, they are
relatively modest, far below those expected in Africa and India.238 We might therefore
expect that the United States and China would be unlikely to be particularly interested in
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, at least on these figures; and as we have seen, their
behavior is consistent with that prediction. To be sure, these numbers are speculative.
They depend on anticipated warming of 2.5 C; perhaps that number is understated. The
world’s economy is interdependent, and if many nations suffer serious adverse effects,
the United States and China will be affected. But the central point is clear. The largest
current contributor, the United States, ranks toward the bottom in terms of anticipated
losses – and that the largest future contributor, China, ranks even lower.
But how much do nations stand to lose from reductions? We have seen that the
costs of the Kyoto Protocol would be especially high for the United States. To see why,
consider the following table, offering a snapshot of global contributors in a recent year
(limited to carbon dioxide, the leading greenhouse gas):
Carbon Dioxide Contributors as of 2000239
Countries
United States
20.6
China
14.7
European Union—25
14.0
Russia
5.7
India
5.6
Japan
3.9
Germany
3.0
Brazil
2.5
Canada
2.0
United Kingdom
1.9
Italy
1.6
South Korea
1.5
France
1.5
Mexico
1.5
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An important question, of course, involves trends over time. Significant
contributors in the past may not be significant contributors in the future. The existing data
suggest that the largest contributors are likely to continue to qualify as such—but that
there will be important shifts, above all with emissions growth in China and India, and
emissions reductions in Russia and Germany.
Carbon Dioxide Emissions Changes, 1990–2002240
Countries
China
49
United States
18
India
70
South Korea
97
Iran
93
Indonesia
97
Saudi Arabia
91
Brazil
57
Spain
44
Pakistan
60
Poland
–17
EU-25
–2
Germany
–13
Ukraine
–48
Russia
–23

With these trend lines, we can project changes by 2025. At that time, the
developing world is expected to contribute no less than 84% of total emissions, with 35%
coming from developed nations. At that time, the United States is expected to be well
below China. Consider the figures for anticipated growth:
Projected Growth in Carbon Dioxide Emissions by 2025241
India
73–225
Mexico
68–215
China
50–181
Brazil
84–165
South Korea
43–117
European Union
–1–39
United States
20–52
World
33–93

In terms of aggregate contributions, these changes mean that there will be significant
shifts among contributors:
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Relative Contributions of Annual Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Country/Region (Approximate %
of Worldwide Emissions)
1990
2003
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
United States
23.4%
22.8%
21.0%
20.0%
19.4%
18.9%
18.6%
Europe
28.0%
21.4%
19.1%
18.2%
17.4%
16.8%
16.3%
China
10.6%
14.1%
19.3%
20.8%
22.2%
23.3%
24.5%
India
2.7%
4.1%
4.5%
4.7%
4.9%
5.0%
5.0%
Japan
4.8%
4.8%
4.05%
3.6%
3.3%
3.0%
2.8%
Africa
3.1%
3.6%
3.9%
4.0%
4.0%
4.0%
4.0%
Source: EIA, Intenational Energy Outlook 2006, Table A10,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/ieoreftab_10.pdf

We can now see a real obstacle to an international agreement to control
greenhouse gases. The United States and China are the largest emitters; they also stand to
lose relatively little from climate change. In terms of their own domestic self-interest, the
argument for stringent controls is not easy to support. The nations of Africa stand to lose
a great deal, but they are trivial greenhouse gas emitters. India is even more vulnerable,
and its contribution, while not exactly trivial, is modest. Actually the analysis has an
additional complexity. Some nations, above all China and India, might reasonably object
that their own contribution is smaller than the aggregate figures suggest. In assessing
relative contributions, we might be interested in cumulative emissions rather than annual
emissions. The overall stock might matter, not the current flow. Here is the relevant data:
Cumulative CO2 Emissions, 1850–2002242
Countries
United States
29.3
EU-25
26.5
Russia
8.1
China
7.6
Germany
7.3
United Kingdom
6.3
Japan
4.1
France
2.9
India
2.2
Ukraine
2.2
India
2.2

Even if China’s emissions rates pass those of the United States by (say) 2020, it
might well insist that it should not bear the same economic burden as a nation that is
responsible for a much larger percentage of aggregate emissions. Undoubtedly the purely
domestic calculus—of costs and benefits—will play a significant role in any nation’s
decisions. But fairness judgments, attending to cumulative contributions, are unlikely to
be irrelevant.
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D. Normative Issues
These are descriptive points, and none of them should be taken to suggest that the
domestic cost-benefit analysis ought to be decisive in principle. In fact it should not be. If
one nation is imposing significant harms on citizens of another, it should not continue to
do so even if, or because, a purely domestic analysis suggests that emissions reductions
are not justified from the point of view of the nation that is imposing those harms. As I
have suggested, the problems of ozone depletion and climate change stem
disproportionately from the actions of wealthy nations, above all United States—actions
from which citizens of wealthy nations, above all the United States, have
disproportionately benefited. It is even possible to see the emission of greenhouse gases
as a kind of tort, producing damage for which emitters, and those who gained from their
actions, ought to pay.243 For example, energy and gasoline prices in the United States
have been far lower than they would have been if those prices had included an amount
attributable to the increased risks of climate change—risks that are most serious, and that
threaten to impose devastating harm on people in other countries.244
Whether nations as such should be held responsible, and what such responsibility
should specifically entail, are complicated questions. But in view of the fact that
Americans have gained so much from activities that impose risks on citizens of other
nations, it seems clear that they have a special obligation to mitigate the harm, or to
provide assistance to those who are likely to suffer. The assistance might take the form of
financial or technological aid, making it easier to meet emissions targets, or monetary
amounts designed to ease adaptation to hotter climates.
The moral issues raise many problems, and they must be seriously engaged as part
of both domestic discussions and international negotiations.245 The Montreal Protocol
holds out some hope here; recall that judgments about moral responsibility, and capacity
to pay, played a serious role in various provisions. We have also seen that incipient steps
to help poor nations have been made in the context of climate change as well.246 (It may
not be irrelevant, and it is certainly worth noticing, that the health risks of ozone
depletion were faced mostly by light-skinned people, most vulnerable to skin cancer,
whereas the most serious risks of climate change are faced by a group that prominently
includes dark-skinned people, above all in Africa.) But the evidence catalogued here
raises doubts about the claim that by themselves, moral obligations will provide enough
motivation in the face of a palpably unfavorable cost-benefit analysis.
But let us return to simpler matters. With respect to the United States, the lesson
of the Montreal Protocol can be captured in a single sentence: Where the domestic
assessment strongly favors unilateral action, and where the same assessment suggests
243
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that a nation is likely to gain a great deal from an international agreement, that nation
will favor such an agreement—unless, perhaps, well-organized private groups are able to
persuade it not to do so. For the Kyoto Protocol, the lesson is equally simple: Where the
domestic assessment suggests that unilateral action makes little sense, and where the
same assessment suggests that a nation will lose a great deal from an international
agreement, that nation is unlikely to favor such an agreement—unless, perhaps, the
public is willing to demand that it do so. In light of these simple lessons, the two
protocols present polar cases, and actually fairly easy ones.
E. Possible Worlds
Nothing said here is inconsistent with the claim that an agreement to control
greenhouse gases might be appealing or at least acceptable to the United States even if
the cost-benefit calculation were fairly close, or perhaps mildly unfavorable to the deal.
The Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol were at opposite extremes, in which the
technocrats, both scientists and economists, seemed to demonstrate that the Montreal
Protocol was a terrific bargain for the United States, while the Kyoto Protocol presented a
much less favorable picture. The overwhelming votes in the Senate are at least suggestive
on this count. Recall the nearly unanimous call for a strong response to the ozone
problem, contrasting with a unanimous call for steps that would effectively prevent
United States participation in the Kyoto Protocol; recall too the unanimous Senate
ratification of the Montreal Protocol under President Reagan, contrasting with the
absence of any support, within the Senate, for the Kyoto Protocol under President
Clinton.
But for both agreements, the overall assessment would have been far more
difficult if the relevant numbers were closer—if the scientific and economic judgments,
working together, suggested that reasonable people could differ. Even if the United States
was a modest net loser, perhaps moral considerations might have tipped, or might in the
future tip, the national calculus in favor of an agreement to control climate change. But it
should be clear that in order for such an agreement to be acceptable to the United States,
a method must be found to drive down the costs and to increase the benefits.247 Such a
method would make the relevant agreement far more attractive to the world as well—and
hence increase the likelihood of compliance by nations that are now showing unfavorable
trends.
1. Benefits. Recall that the Kyoto Protocol was projected to decrease global mean
temperatures by a mere 0.03 C. This difference is less trivial than it sounds, because it is
projected to produce tens of billions in monetized benefits,248 but it is nonetheless a
relative drop in the bucket. Developing countries are projected to account for over half of
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total global emissions by 2020 and possibly before.249 We have seen that a broader
agreement, including China and India in particular, would significantly increase the
benefits of greenhouse gas reduction and hence would make domestic controls far more
attractive to both the United States and the world.250 The trick is to make such an
agreement sufficiently attractive to developing nations to make it possible for them to
participate.
A useful step would involve a clear distinction between stocks and flows.251 To
come to terms with past contributions, nations might participate in the creation of some
kind of fund for climate change damages, with their participation reflecting their
contributions to the total existing stock of emissions. India and China need not contribute
much to such a fund; the United States and Europe would be required to contribute a
great deal. A step of this kind would be a sensible response to the fact, shown by the table
above, that different nations have added dramatically different amounts to the current
situation.
A different step would involve the response to existing flows. Perhaps a “polluters
pay” principle could be made a part of an international agreement, so that nations would
pay an amount to reflect their continuing contributions.252 In short, greenhouse gas
emissions might be taxed, with the hope that the tax would lead to reductions. It would be
easy to do something of this kind domestically, and an international agreement might
form the basis for the imposition of greenhouse taxes. Alternatively, an understanding of
past contributions and current emissions rates might be built into a structure closer to that
of the Montreal Protocol, helping to serve as the foundation for both reduction
requirements and economic transfers. In particular, the transfers might be designed to
compensate for past and future contributions to the problem. If high contributors make
significant cuts, perhaps their transfers need not be so large. If they continue to be high
contributors, their transfers might be very high. If the goal is to ensure significant
benefits, steps of this sort would be the place to start.
2. Costs. On the cost side, two steps would be highly desirable. The first is to
create an ambitious and reliable system for fully global emissions trading, which could
make the cost-benefit ratio far more favorable for any agreement. The second is to
produce better targets and requirements, in a way that allows stringency to increase over
time.
Consider emissions trading first. In the context of acid deposition, the United
States was able to reduce the cost of aggressive regulation by billions of dollars through
an ambitious trading system.253 For climate change, such a system would decrease the
need for expensive regulation, by allowing American companies to “buy” American
249

See Sheila M. Olmstead and Robert N. Stavins, An International Policy Architecture for the PostKyoto Era, 96 Am. Econ. Rev. 35, 35-36(Papers and Proceedings) (2006).
250
See Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note, at 123-44; Barrett, supra note, at 379.
251
See the excellent brief discussion in Jagdish Bhagwati, Global Warming Fund Could Succeed
Where Kyoto Failed, Financial Times (Aug. 16, 2006).
252
See id.
253
See A. Denny Ellerman et al., Markets for Clean Air (1999).

42

emissions credits from greenhouse gas producers in other nations. For the Kyoto
Protocol, a system of global trading would reduce domestic costs from $325 billion to
$91 billion—and it would reduce worldwide costs from $217 billion to $59 billion.254
The likelihood that China would participate in an international agreement would certainly
increase with an emissions trading system. Perhaps China and India, and other poor
nations, could be subsidized with especially high allocations of trading rights, so as to
come to terms with their relatively low past contributions, their general poverty, and their
overall needs.
The emissions reductions targets in the Kyoto Protocol are both rigid and
arbitrary, at least from the standpoint of sensible policy. The key terms of that protocol
involve an apparently random baseline year (1990) and ask nations to produce apparently
random percentage reductions from that year.255 As we have seen, there is a method, or at
least domestic self-interest, behind this apparent madness; but the method has no
connection with sensible policy.256 A better approach would include carbon taxes or
emissions reduction requirements that grow over time as technology advances.257 For
ozone-depleting chemicals, as for lead, the United States followed a phase-down policy,
one that allowed time for the development and marketing of adequate substitutes.258 No
one is proposing the complete elimination of greenhouse gases; increasing restrictions
over time would make a great deal of sense.259
3. Manageability and enforcement. There is an additional point, much bearing on
the prospects for an effective international agreement and on the possible participation of
the United States. The Montreal Protocol was negotiated by about thirty nations; current
climate negotiations involve nearly 200 nations.260 The large number of parties makes an
agreement far less manageable, and reasonably makes some nations fearful that others
will not comply.261 Suppose, as seems reasonable, that an imaginable agreement could
solve an international prisoner’s dilemma with respect to global climate change. The
parties to such an agreement must be able to be confident that others will not cheat. With
200 nations, and difficult issues of monitoring, key nations might well be tempted to
defect—or not to join in the first instance.262
This is not the place to outline the ingredients of an international agreement to
respond to the risks associated with climate change.263 The steps I have outlined would
have to be accompanied by clear steps to promote monitoring and enforcement of any
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limits.264 The central points are that such an agreement is unlikely to be effective without
the participation of the United States, and that such participation is unlikely without a
much more favorable domestic cost-benefit ratio. Of course new information about the
risks of climate change, suggesting that earlier projections are too optimistic, would
inevitably help to alter the domestic equation.265
Conclusion
At first glance, the problems of ozone depletion and climate change seem
exceedingly similar, and to present closely related challenges for the production of an
international agreement to reduce the underlying risks. In both contexts, nations appear to
have a great deal to gain from cooperative action. In both contexts, technological
innovation is highly desirable as a means of reducing the costs of regulation. In both
contexts, intergenerational equity is a serious and complex issue. In both contexts,
wealthy nations are responsible for the problem in the first instance, and poor nations
have a plausible claim to compensation, both for harm done and in return for their
willingness to reduce emissions in the future.
Notwithstanding the similarities, the Montreal Protocol has proved a stunning
success, and the Kyoto Protocol has largely failed. From one agreement to the other, the
posture of many nations shifted, with European nations treating ozone depletion as a
highly speculative theory, calling for further research, while later leading the call for
aggressive regulation of greenhouse gases. The contrasting outcomes are best explained
by reference to the radically different approaches taken by the United States—by far the
most significant contributor, per capita, to both ozone depletion and climate change. It
would be tempting to attribute those different approaches to the different political
convictions of the relevant administrations. But the Reagan Administration, which
pressed for the Montreal Protocol, was hardly known for its aggressiveness with respect
to environmental policy, and the Senate showed no interest in the Kyoto Protocol during
the Clinton Administration. The American posture, and hence the fate of the two
protocols, was largely determined by perceived benefits and costs.
To the United States, the benefits of the Montreal Protocol were anticipated to be
substantial in the short-term as well as the long-term. To the United States, the benefits of
the Kyoto Protocol were perceived to be effectively zero in the short-term and modest in
the long-term. The projected costs of the Montreal Protocol were relatively small—for
the United States, $21 billion, a small fraction of the benefits. The costs of the Kyoto
Protocol were projected to be high—for the United States, $325 billion, well in excess of
the benefits. The picture was not altogether different for the world. The Montreal
Protocol was a worldwide bargain, with costs a tiny percentage of benefits. By contrast,
key analysts suggested that the Kyoto Protocol failed in cost-benefit terms, and the best
that might be said is that the agreement provided an initial foundation for better and more
inclusive ones. Of course the precise numbers are disputed, and legitimate questions can
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be raised about any particular account. What matters is that at the crucial times, the most
authoritative accounts offered conflicting conclusions about the two agreements.
As we have seen, neither protocol fits the simple model of a solution to a
prisoner’s dilemma. The United States, and many other countries, appear to have had
sufficient reason, from the standpoint of self-interest, to comply with the requirements of
the Montreal Protocol even if no other country did the same. The United States, and some
other countries, appear to have had no adequate reason, from the standpoint of selfinterest, to comply with the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol even if such compliance
would help to ensure that every other country did the same. For this reason, the payoff
structure of the two agreements were fundamentally different, and their different fates
have a great deal to do with that fact.
To this point it must be added that developing countries, above all China and
India, refused to participate in the Kyoto Protocol, in large part because the domestic
cost-benefit analysis was so unfavorable for them. For the future, a special problems lies
in the distinctive incentives of the United States (the world’s leading emitter of
greenhouse gases) and China (soon to overtake the United States, which will still be far
ahead on a per capita basis). Both nations would have to pay the lion’s share of the cost
of an agreement to limit emissions. At the same time, both nations appear to have
disproportionately little to fear from climate change. Unless China and the United States
can be convinced that the domestic cost-benefit is more favorable than it now appears, or
that the requirements of morality call for significant emissions reductions, the prospects
for their participation are limited.
For those who are concerned about the risks of climate change, it would be
possible and even right to emphasize that the United States has been a principal
contributor to those risks, and that the nation’s economic self-interest does not exhaust its
moral obligations. To the extent that the citizens of the United States have benefited from
activities that inflict significant harms on other nations, those citizens are properly asked
to help—through reducing their own emissions, through paying other nations to reduce
theirs, and through payments to ease adaptation. But on the basis of tales of the Montreal
and Kyoto Protocols, it is best to assume that domestic self-interest will continue to be an
important motivating force. It follows that for the future, the task is to devise an
international agreement that resembles the Montreal Protocol in one critical respect: Its
signatories, including the United States, have reason to believe that they will gain more
than they will lose.
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